As 2025 comes to a close, India’s foreign policy has largely adhered to institutional wisdom and pivoted around the centre. While the opposition has criticised several foreign policy decisions made by the Modi government, there is an apparent consensus on most issues beneath the political surface. In other words, the government has not strayed significantly from an established foreign policy template, notwithstanding the rhetoric on either side of the aisle.
Let’s examine a few examples to explore the policies, critiques, and areas of convergence. Paradoxically, the issue that had the most amount of consensus behind it was also the one under the greatest external pressure – India’s relations with Russia. Despite relentless Western displeasure and the shadow of the Ukraine conflict, Delhi’s relationship with Moscow remained an important point of convergence. While the US and the West were critical of the relationship, the domestic opposition remained largely supportive of the relationship with Russia.
This consensus is remarkable because even though there is a widespread belief about the structural limitations straining India-Russia relations, both sides of the aisle seem to recognise Russia continues to be an indispensable partner. In a year where India’s continental challenges grew sharper, neither side was willing to sabotage the only country they believed would act as India’s partner in the continental space.
If Russia were a point of consensus, the Israel-Palestine issue generated what looked like a fierce ideological war between the government and the Congress. The government’s tilt toward Israel (which acknowledges the importance of Israel for India’s defence needs) was most definitively demonstrated by India’s June 2025 abstention from the UNGA ceasefire resolution.
The Congress was relentless in its criticism of the government, with Mallikarjun Kharge and Priyanka Gandhi Vadra terming the move “shameful,” arguing it betrayed India’s anti-colonial identity and moral standing. But would a Congress government have acted differently had it been in power? My sense is that the foreign policy/security institutions of the Indian state would have, keeping in mind the sheer weight of defense and intelligence cooperation with Israel, eventually produced a somewhat similar balanced (read pro-Israel) policy, even if frontloaded by a softer and moral rhetoric. So the difference is actually about optics, in my opinion, not the substance of the relationship with Israel.
The disagreement between the government and the opposition primarily revolved around the “how” and not the “what” of New Delhi’s approach to the crisis in Bangladesh. Following the dramatic ouster of the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina taking asylum in India, the opposition’s critique sharply highlighted
the failure of political foresight as well as diplomatic and intelligence failures: not engaging the various political entities in Bangladesh, not foreseeing the events that took place, and the failure to contain the diplomatic fallout on India.
The question was why New Delhi had put all its eggs in one basket, leaving India without friends among the new political formations in Dhaka. In fact, this is a question many within the government are asking themselves today. And yet, a Congress government, had it been in power, would have ended with pretty much the same situation on their hands for at least two reasons, and their response would not have been drastically different: one, what is happening in Bangladesh is a function of its own domestic politics and has nothing to do with India, and two, India’s old equations with the region are changing and that will reflect in India’s ability to manage crises situations in the region. This is a structural reality any government of the day in Delhi will have to keeping mind while framing its neighbourhood policy.
The immediate aftermath of the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which claimed 26 lives, triggered a great deal of national unity and cross-party solidarity. The opposition stood by Operation Sindoor, a retaliatory operation against Pakistan. Over time, however, the opposition attacked the government on intelligence failures and the messy optics of the ceasefire announcement involving the US president. While they didn’t disagree with the
military operation against Pakistan, they disagreed with how the government managed the aftermath, making it a critique of the government’s competence, not a critique of the action itself.
The disagreement between the government and the opposition on China was sharp. The government’s tactical reset with China by resuming flights, easing visas for technicians, and allowing investments was criticised by Rahul Gandhi with a stinging indictment that “China is sitting in our territory” because “Make in India has failed.” He argued that India’s economic dependence on Beijing is a form of “strategic surrender.”
While that is a powerful political narrative, I am not sure even a Congress government would have found decoupling from China an economic possibility. I am sure even the opposition recognises that panda-sized economic reality on India’s borders.
Finally, India’s fraying relations with Washington also came in for some criticism as Trump’s return brought 50% tariffs on India and a renewed US outreach to Pakistan. The opposition reaction was less substantive and more about the failure of the personal chemistry diplomacy between Trump and Modi that failed to protect Indian economic interests.
But had the Congress been in power, would they have done anything dramatically different? Unlikely. Whether it is the purchase of Russian oil or the refusal to give Trump credit for the Sindoor ceasefire or responding to terror from Pakistan, the Indian state’s commitment to strategic autonomy, and the pursuit of interests are perhaps the natural course of action for any government in New Delhi, no matter the ideological orientation.
To me, therefore, the year 2025 indicates that while the political rhetoric of Indian foreign policy is fiercely contested, as it happens in democracies, the substance of it is becoming increasingly institutionalised and moving towards the middle path.
Happymon Jacob is a distinguished visiting professor of Shiv Nadar University, the founder-director of Council for Strategic and Defense Research, and editor of INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
